United Nations Needs a Rapid Reaction Force

On innumerable occasions since its founding in 1945, the United Nations has found itself burdened with the responsibility of preventing or ending military conflicts between nation-states, as well as attempting to rescue vulnerable populations from genocide and other crimes against humanity. It has had to monitor cease-fire lines and ensure that conflicts which have ended do not flare up again. On many occasions, it has also had to intervene many times to bring emergency relief and restore law and order in the wake of natural disasters such hurricanes and earthquakes.

All of this requires troops, and ever since the first authorized U.N. peacekeeping mission was launched in 1948 (to monitor the cease-fire between Egypt and Israel), the blue-helmeted U.N. peacekeepers driving their white-painted vehicles have become a common sight in conflict zones throughout the world. Over six decades of service, nearly 2,500 U.N. peacekeepers have been killed in the line of duty. In 1988, they were collectively awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

The U.N. peacekeepers have often achieved great success in the face of heavy odds. On numerous occasions, they have interposed themselves between warring Israeli and Arab armies to stop bloodshed. They have monitored cease-fires in the Middle East, the Balkans, Cyprus, and throughout Africa and Central America. They have supervised transitions to democracy in places like Cambodia and East Timor. They have been on the ground to help provide disaster relief in areas throughout the world. But there have also been several high-profile disasters, and what the U.N. peacekeepers have achieved pales before what they might be able to achieve if certain systematic restraints were removed.

It should be pointed out that U.N. peacekeeping operations cost about $5 billion a year. For comparison, this is less than 4% of the annual pork-ridden budget of the United States Department of Agriculture. Indeed, it is only slightly more than the cost of two United States B-2 bombers.

Amazingly, the U.N. technically has no military units of its own.  All U.N. peacekeeping operations are carried out by troops voluntarily contributed by U.N. member states. While this may sound like a good idea, it actually is the key weakness of many U.N. peacekeeping operations, and has been the main cause of many disastrous failures.

Consider Rwanda, perhaps the darkest chapter in the history of U.N. peacekeeping operations. When the Rwandan Genocide began in 1994, there were already U.N. Peacekeepers on the ground in the country, but intervening to stop the killings would doubtless have endangered the lives of many of these men. Consequently, many nervous governments declined to support an expanded mission for the U.N. force in the country and refused to contribute troops. Many of the troops that did remain were poorly-trained Bangladeshi and Pakistani troops, who had little understanding of or enthusiasm for the mission to which they were assigned. 800,000 Rwandans were killed in the subsequent genocide.

So long as the troops for U.N. peacekeeping missions are delegated from the armies of member states, there were always be a reluctance on the part of governments to commit their troops to potentially dangerous situations. Even when there is the necessary political will, it inevitably takes time to organize a multinational force that will undoubtedly consist of battalions from many different nations. Former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan once likened it to being the chief of a fire department who had to recruit volunteers, raise money, and buy a fire truck every time there was a fire in town.

More fundamentally, the units delegated to U.N. peacekeeping duties often have no training whatsoever for the tasks to which they are assigned. Indeed, the bulk of troops that make up U.N. peacekeeping forces are usually contributed by developing nations with poorly-equipped an poorly-trained militaries. This has not only resulted in an inability to achieve the objectives of the mission, but has also contributed to a disturbing rise in child prostitution in African and Balkan nations where U.N. peacekeepers have been deployed.

There is a potential answer to all these problems: the United Nations needs it own military Rapid Reaction Force. Having such a force at its command would allow the U.N. to undertake emergency operations within hours of a crisis erupting anywhere in the world. There would be no need to go begging to member states for a battalion or two, and there would be no concern about the level of training or professionalism of the troops being sent into harm's way.

Imagine how the Rwanda crisis might have unfolded had the U.N. had a Rapid Reaction Force at its disposal. Without the reluctance of member states to send their own young men into danger, the U.N. force could have been ordered to intervene immediately. And in contrast to the poorly-trained and poorly-motivated contingents making up the U.N. force in Rwanda, we would have seen well-trained professional troops with experienced officers at their head. The 800,000 Rwandans who died in the genocide might have been saved.

We can envision of force of perhaps 20,000 troops organized perhaps into ten regiments, stationed around the world at bases allowing them to rapidly deploy to trouble spots wherever conflicts might conceivably break out. The bulk of the force would obviously be light infantry, but would also have to include transport and logistics units, light artillery and armor for protection, and air elements for reconnaissance.

The potential locations for the bases of such a force would clearly need to be carefully thought out. Just as a thought experiment, I might suggest French Guyana (to cover the Western Hemisphere), Ghana or Cote D'Ivoire (to cover West Africa), Malta (to cover Europe and the Mediterranean), Djibouti (to cover East Africa and the Middle East), and Brunei (to cover Asia).

How would such a force be recruited? One military unit that stands out as a potential example is the French Foreign Legion. This legendary unit of the French Army accepts only the most fit and motivated recruits, and doesn't much care where they come from or what their past history has been. Consequently, the French Foreign Legion is made up of men who either want to start their life over again or are simply seeking adventure. With the right training, these men have proven themselves time and again to be among the best soldiers who ever walked the Earth, fiercely loyal to their unit.

Another potential example is the Brigade of Gurkhas. The British, having fought a brief but bitter war with the men from Nepal in the early 19th Century, decided that it was much better to co-opt them than fight them. Subsequently, battalions of Gurkhas have served in the British Army (as well as the Indian Army and with the Singapore police) ever since. They are universally considered to be among the finest infantry in the world. Perhaps the United Nations could recruit a battalion or two?

However the recruiting is done and wherever these troops will be based, the urgent need for a U.N. Rapid Reaction Force is clear. Long term peacekeeping operations, obviously, would still require units volunteered by member states, but immediate emergencies would be much more effectively dealt with if the U.N. had an easily deployed military force of its own. The Security Council would be more likely to act quickly if they kne they would have need to deal with the complicated politics of persuading member states to contribute troops to peacekeeping operations.

The Security Council should immediately begin laying the groundwork for a permanent agreement on a U.N. Rapid Reaction Force, perhaps beginning with a single battalion and building up from there. In the long run, a respectable U.N. force, with its own proud unit identity and elan, is essential.